It was earlier shown that evidence in general is not transitive. The reason given was that if A is evidence for B, and B for C, A is not necessarily evidence for C, because the cases where A and B are the case can be disjoint from the cases where B and C are the case.
However, this does not prevent evidence from being transitive on particular occasions, and possibly on most occasions, namely whenever situations where A and B are the case are the same or mostly the same situations where B and C are the case.
For example, if someone speaks with me in a loud tone and with a red face, that is evidence that he is angry with me; and if he is angry with me, that is evidence that I have said or done something which offended him; and likewise speaking with me in a loud tone and with a red face is evidence that I have said or done something which offended him. In this case situations where A and B are the case, namely where someone is angry and speaking angrily with me, overlap a good deal with cases where B and C are the case, namely where the person is angry because I have offended him.
This is quite possibly the more common situation — namely that evidence is transitive in practice — and thus the likely reason why people tend mistakenly to conclude that evidence is always transitive.