Content warning: very obscure.
This post follows up on an earlier post on this topic, as well on what was recently said about real distinction. In the latter post, we applied the distinction between the way a thing is and the way it is known in order to better understand distinction itself. We can obtain a better understanding of unity in a similar way.
As was said in the earlier post on unity, to say that something is “one” does not add anything real to the being of the thing, but it adds the denial of the division between distinct things. The single apple is not “an apple and an orange,” which are divided insofar as they are distinct from one another.
But being distinct from divided things is itself a certain way of being distinct, and consequently all that was said about distinction in general will apply to this way of being distinct as well. In particular, since being distinct means not being something, which is a way that things are understood rather than a way that they are (considered precisely as a way of being), the same thing applies to unity. To say that something is one does not add something to the way that it is, but it adds something to the way that it is understood. This way of being understood is founded, we argued, on existing relationships.
We should avoid two errors here, both of which would be expressions of the Kantian error:
First, the argument here does not mean that a thing is not truly one thing, just as the earlier discussion does not imply that it is false that a chair is not a desk. On the contrary, a chair is in fact not a desk, and a chair is in fact one chair. But when we say or think, “a chair is not a desk,” or “a chair is one chair,” we are saying these things in some way of saying, and thinking them in some way of thinking, and these ways of saying and thinking are not ways of being as such. This in no way implies that the statements themselves are false, just as “the apple seems to be red,” does not imply that the apple is not red. Arguing that the fact of a specific way of understanding implies that the thing is falsely understood would be the position described by Ayn Rand as asserting, “man is blind, because he has eyes—deaf, because he has ears—deluded, because he has a mind—and the things he perceives do not exist, because he perceives them.”
Second, the argument does not imply that the way things really are is unknown and inaccessible to us. One might suppose that this follows, since distinction cannot exist apart from someone’s way of understanding, and at the same time no one can understand without making distinctions. Consequently, someone might argue, there must be some “way things really are in themselves,” which does not include distinction or unity, but which cannot be understood. But this is just a different way of falling into the first error above. There is indeed a way things are, and it is generally not inaccessible to us. In fact, as I pointed out earlier, it would be a contradiction to assert the existence of anything entirely unknowable to us.
Our discussion, being in human language and human thought, naturally uses the proper modes of language and thought. And just as in Mary’s room, where her former knowledge of color is a way of knowing and not a way of sensing, so our discussion advances by ways of discussion, not by ways of being as such. This does not prevent the way things are from being an object of discussion, just as color can be an object of knowledge.
Having avoided these errors, someone might say that nothing of consequence follows from this account. But this would be a mistake. It follows from the present account that when we ask questions like, “How many things are here?”, we are not asking a question purely about how things are, but to some extent about how we should understand them. And even when there is a single way that things are, there is usually not only one way to understand them correctly, but many ways.
Consider some particular question of this kind: “How many things are in this room?” People might answer this question in various ways. John Nerst, in a previous discussion on this blog, seemed to suggest that the answer should be found by counting fundamental particles. Alexander Pruss would give a more complicated answer, since he suggests that large objects like humans and animals should be counted as wholes (while also wishing to deny the existence of parts, which would actually eliminate the notion of a whole), while in other cases he might agree to counting particles. Thus a human being and an armchair might be counted, more or less, as 1 + 10^28 things, namely counting the human being as one thing and the chair as a number of particles.
But if we understand that the question is not, and cannot be, purely about how things are, but is also a question about how things should be understood, then both of the above responses seem unreasonable: they are both relatively bad ways of understanding the things in the room, even if they both have some truth as well. And on the other hand, it is easy to see that “it depends on how you count,” is part of the answer. There is not one true answer to the question, but many true answers that touch on different aspects of the reality in the room.
From the discussion with John Nerst, consider this comment:
My central contention is that the rules that define the universe runs by themselves, and must therefore be self-contained, i.e not need any interpretation or operationalization from outside the system. As I think I said in one of the parts of “Erisology of Self and Will” that the universe must be an automaton, or controlled by an automaton, etc. Formal rules at the bottom.
This is isn’t convincing to you I guess but I suppose I rule out fundamental vagueness because vagueness implies complexity and fundamental complexity is a contradiction in terms. If you keep zooming in on a fuzzy picture you must, at some point, come down to sharply delineated pixels.
Among other things, the argument of the present post shows why this cannot be right. “Sharply delineated pixels” includes the distinction of one pixel from another, and therefore includes something which is a way of understanding as such, not a way of being as such. In other words, while intending to find what is really there, apart from any interpretation, Nerst is directly including a human interpretation in his account. And in fact it is perfectly obvious that anything else is impossible, since any account of reality given by us will be a human account and will thus include a human way of understanding. Things are a certain way: but that way cannot be said or thought except by using ways of speaking or thinking.
3 thoughts on “Being and Unity II”
So I wonder whether I should be concerned about the fact that I think I understand this obscurity trigger warning post pretty well, but the ones that are supposed to be obvious make my brain explode…
Well, if you’ve followed the threads that lead up to this post it does follow in a pretty straightforward way. In that way the warning would be more for someone reading it randomly without having read what comes before.
In another way it applies even if you understand it, though. In one way of course your mind cannot get in the way of understanding reality; that is one of the Kantian errors that I have been referring to, namely something like, “If only I could understand reality without a mind! That way, I would understand it the way it really is!”. Which of course is absurd. If you did not have a mind, you would not understand, period. But in another way, your mind can sort of get in the way. In this way the confusion between the way you think and the way things are is a very natural one, and is involved in some way in almost all philosophical errors, and perhaps in most errors in general. And I think, in this case, people will naturally tend to fall into one or the other of the Kantian errors here, even after theoretically understanding the matter. That is, if you think about it too much, try to draw out consequences and so forth, you will frequently fall into thinking in one or the other of the erroneous ways. This may explain a lot of what happened to Kant himself. That’s why I suggested in one of the earlier posts that he may have flip-flopped between true and false interpretations of his account.
There’s a similar case with Aristotle in the Prior Analytics. He clearly makes the distinction between statements that are necessarily true, considered as statements, e.g. “Necessarily, white things are not black,” and necessity as applied to the thing, e.g., “This white thing is necessarily white and cannot be black.” The first just means that “a white thing is black” is never true, while the second is making the claim that the white thing itself, as a thing, cannot be black, not just because it is in fact white. So the first can be true while the second is false. But even though he makes the distinction, when he discusses modal syllogisms, he randomly flips back and forth between these interpretations without mentioning it, and evidently without noticing (since he does it within a single syllogism.)
LOL! So I think I understand but I don’t. I thought it had to be something like that.