This post builds on the ideas in the series of posts on predictive processing and the followup posts, and also on those relating truth and expectation. Consequently the current post will likely not make much sense to those who have not read the earlier content, or to those that read it but mainly disagreed.
We set out the model by positing three members of the “company” that constitutes a human being:
The CEO. This is the predictive engine in the predictive processing model.
The Vice President. In the same model, this is the force of the historical element in the human being, which we used to respond to the “darkened room” problem. Thus for example the Vice President is responsible for the fact that someone is likely to eat soon, regardless of what they believe about this. Likewise, it is responsible for the pursuit of sex, the desire for respect and friendship, and so on. In general it is responsible for behaviors that would have been historically chosen and preserved by natural selection.
The Employee. This is the conscious person who has beliefs and goals and free will and is reflectively aware of these things. In other words, this is you, at least in a fairly ordinary way of thinking of yourself. Obviously, in another way you are composed from all of them.
Why have we arranged things in this way? Descartes, for example, would almost certainly disagree violently with this model. The conscious person, according to him, would surely be the CEO, and not an employee. And what is responsible for the relationship between the CEO and the Vice President? Let us start with this point first, before we discuss the Employee. We make the predictive engine the CEO because in some sense this engine is responsible for everything that a human being does, including the behaviors preserved by natural selection. On the other hand, the instinctive behaviors of natural selection are not responsible for everything, but they can affect the course of things enough that it is useful for the predictive engine to take them into account. Thus for example in the post on sex and minimizing uncertainty, we explained why the predictive engine will aim for situations that include having sex and why this will make its predictions more confident. Thus, the Vice President advises certain behaviors, the CEO talks to the Vice President, and the CEO ends up deciding on a course of action, which ultimately may or may not be the one advised by the Vice President.
While neither the CEO nor the Vice President is a rational being, since in our model we place the rationality in the Employee, that does not mean they are stupid. In particular, the CEO is very good at what it does. Consider a role playing video game where you have a character that can die and then resume. When someone first starts to play the game, they may die frequently. After they are good at the game, they may die only rarely, perhaps once in many days or many weeks. Our CEO is in a similar situation, but it frequently goes 80 years or more without dying, on its very first attempt. It is extremely good at its game.
What are their goals? The CEO basically wants accurate predictions. In this sense, it has one unified goal. What exactly counts as more or less accurate here would be a scientific question that we probably cannot resolve by philosophical discussion. In fact, it is very possible that this would differ in different circumstances: in this sense, even though it has a unified goal, it might not be describable by a consistent utility function. And even if it can be described in that way, since the CEO is not rational, it does not (in itself) make plans to bring about correct predictions. Making good predictions is just what it does, as falling is what a rock does. There will be some qualifications on this, however, when we discuss how the members of the company relate to one another.
The Vice President has many goals: eating regularly, having sex, having and raising children, being respected and liked by others, and so on. And even more than in the case of the CEO, there is no reason for these desires to form a coherent set of preferences. Thus the Vice President might advise the pursuit of one goal, but then change its mind in the middle, for no apparent reason, because it is suddenly attracted by one of the other goals.
Overall, before the Employee is involved, human action is determined by a kind of negotiation between the CEO and the Vice President. The CEO, which wants good predictions, has no special interest in the goals of the Vice President, but it cooperates with them because when it cooperates its predictions tend to be better.
What about the Employee? This is the rational being, and it has abstract concepts which it uses as a formal copy of the world. Before I go on, let me insist clearly on one point. If the world is represented in a certain way in the Employee’s conceptual structure, that is the way the Employee thinks the world is. And since you are the Employee, that is the way you think the world actually is. The point is that once we start thinking this way, it is easy to say, “oh, this is just a model, it’s not meant to be the real thing.” But as I said here, it is not possible to separate the truth of statements from the way the world actually is: your thoughts are formulated in concepts, but they are thoughts about the way things are. Again, all statements are maps, and all statements are about the territory.
The CEO and the Vice President exist as soon a human being has a brain; in fact some aspects of the Vice President would exist even before that. But the Employee, insofar as it refers to something with rational and self-reflective knowledge, takes some time to develop. Conceptual knowledge of the world grows from experience: it doesn’t exist from the beginning. And the Employee represents goals in terms of its conceptual structure. This is just a way of saying that as a rational being, if you say you are pursuing a goal, you have to be able to describe that goal with the concepts that you have. Consequently you cannot do this until you have some concepts.
We are ready to address the question raised earlier. Why are you the Employee, and not the CEO? In the first place, the CEO got to the company first, as we saw above. Second, consider what the conscious person does when they decide to pursue a goal. There seems to be something incoherent about “choosing a goal” in the first place: you need a goal in order to decide which means will be a good means to choose. And yet, as I said here, people make such choices anyway. And the fact that you are the Employee, and not the CEO, is the explanation for this. If you were the CEO, there would indeed be no way to choose an end. That is why the actual CEO makes no such choice: its end is already determinate, namely good predictions. And you are hired to help out with this goal. Furthermore, as a rational being, you are smarter than the CEO and the Vice President, so to speak. So you are allowed to make complicated plans that they do not really understand, and they will often go along with these plans. Notably, this can happen in real life situations of employers and employees as well.
But take an example where you are choosing an end: suppose you ask, “What should I do with my life?” The same basic thing will happen if you ask, “What should I do today,” but the second question may be easier to answer if you have some answer to the first. What sorts of goals do you propose in answer to the first question, and what sort do you actually end up pursuing?
Note that there are constraints on the goals that you can propose. In the first place, you have to be able to describe the goal with the concepts you currently have: you cannot propose to seek a goal that you cannot describe. Second, the conceptual structure itself may rule out some goals, even if they can be described. For example, the idea of good is part of the structure, and if something is thought to be absolutely bad, the Employee will (generally) not consider proposing this as a goal. Likewise, the Employee may suppose that some things are impossible, and it will generally not propose these as goals.
What happens then is this: the Employee proposes some goal, and the CEO, after consultation with the Vice President, decides to accept or reject it, based on the CEO’s own goal of getting good predictions. This is why the Employee is an Employee: it is not the one ultimately in charge. Likewise, as was said, this is why the Employee seems to be doing something impossible, namely choosing goals. Steven Kaas makes a similar point,
You are not the king of your brain. You are the creepy guy standing next to the king going “a most judicious choice, sire”.
This is not quite the same thing, since in our model you do in fact make real decisions, including decisions about the end to be pursued. Nonetheless, the point about not being the one ultimately in charge is correct. David Hume also says something similar when he says, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Hume’s position is not exactly right, and in fact seems an especially bad way of describing the situation, but the basic point that there is something, other than yourself in the ordinary sense, judging your proposed means and ends and deciding whether to accept them, is one that stands.
Sometimes the CEO will veto a proposal precisely because it very obviously leaves things vague and uncertain, which is contrary to its goal of having good predictions. I once spoke of the example that a person cannot directly choose to “write a paper.” In our present model, the Employee proposes “we’re going to write a paper now,” and the CEO responds, “That’s not a viable plan as it stands: we need more detail.”
While neither the CEO nor the Vice President is a rational being, the Vice President is especially irrational, because of the lack of unity among its goals. Both the CEO and the Employee would like to have a unified plan for one’s whole life: the CEO because this makes for good predictions, and the Employee because this is the way final causes work, because it helps to make sense of one’s life, and because “objectively good” seems to imply something which is at least consistent, which will never prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. But the lack of unity among the Vice President’s goals means that it will always come to the CEO and object, if the person attempts to coherently pursue any goal. This will happen even if it originally accepts the proposal to seek a particular goal.
Consider this real life example from a relationship between an employer and employee:
Employer: Please construct a schedule for paying these bills.
Employee: [Constructs schedule.] Here it is.
[Time passes, and the first bill comes due, according to the schedule.]
Employer: Why do we have to pay this bill now instead of later?
In a similar way, this sort of scenario is common in our model:
Vice President: Being fat makes us look bad. We need to stop being fat.
CEO: Ok, fine. Employee, please formulate a plan to stop us from being fat.
Employee: [Formulates a diet.] Here it is.
[Time passes, and the plan requires skipping a meal.]
Vice President: What is this crazy plan of not eating!?!
CEO: Fine, cancel the plan for now and we’ll get back to it tomorrow.
In the real life example, the behavior of the employer is frustrating and irritating to the employee because there is literally nothing they could have proposed that the employer would have found acceptable. In the same way, this sort of scenario in our model is frustrating to the Employee, the conscious person, because there is no consistent plan they could have proposed that would have been acceptable to the Vice President: either they would have objected to being fat, or they would have objected to not eating.
In later posts, we will fill in some details and continue to show how this model explains various aspects of human psychology. We will also answer various objections.
6 thoughts on “Employer and Employee Model of Human Psychology”
It occurs to me that a somewhat similar account has been proposed in the past by Wei Dai (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yZ4aieJeP85ezeiu3/a-master-slave-model-of-human-preferences ) and by Scott Alexander (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/eaSJtg8Kvc56bFBdt/conflicts-between-mental-subagents-expanding-wei-dai-s )
I would be interested in reading more about what the nature of the ‘Employee’ is in your model. The ‘CEO’ and ‘Vice President’ are described as simpler entities than a human, but I’m not sure exactly how you think of the ‘Employee’. The description in the post makes it sound like a human-level intelligence. Clearly a model of human psychology cannot posit a human within the model without being circular.
Sorry for the delay in approving this. I was away from the internet for quite a while.
To a first approximation, you are right, the Employee is basically “a conscious human as we usually think of one.” This is less circular than you suppose.
To get a sense of this, read this review of Elephant in the Brain by John Nerst: https://everythingstudies.com/2018/08/24/facing-the-elephant/
Basically there is no circularity because “what we usually think of as a conscious human” is only one aspect of “an actual human.” I am trying to explain “actual humans” and using “what we usually think of a conscious human” as just one element in that. The important aspects here of the Employee are consciously modelling the world, consciously thinking of a goal, consciously making choices, and similar ideas. These aspects are just a small part of “an actual human.” So there is no significant circularity here.
Thanks, that makes sense. I have been trying to think of some way to understand the ’employee’ here as not really being a separate entity but being ’emergent’ from the interaction of the Vice President and CEO. This could result if you slightly modify the CEO: it doesn’t just ‘want’ to get good predictions, but to have a concise/compressible model that performs well on all past sense inputs. Then things like ‘goals’ or ‘values’ are the CEO’s attempt at summarizing its own drives and past behavior in a coherent way. This makes its subsequent behavior more coherent, because its actions are now chosen partially according to this coherent model. Other aspects of the Employee’s apparent behavior could also be explained in this way(I think).
Juergen Schmidhuber has a theory like this attempting to explain creativity in terms of compression: http://people.idsia.ch/~juergen/creativity.html
I don’t disagree much with this. We could think of the CEO in a broader way which would include what I am calling the Employee, if we wanted to do that. In particular, I agree that both the conscious mind and the non-conscious parts basically follow the predictive processing model, so we could group them together if we wanted. However, I prefer to distinguish the conscious and non-conscious aspects because there are some interesting differences in how they operate and some interactions between them that I want to look at later. Rather than discussing it now, though, I’ll wait until I get around to those posts.
I agree that goals can be seem as attempts to understand what is already being done. This comes up in some earlier posts (e.g. https://entirelyuseless.wordpress.com/2017/08/18/decisions-as-predictions/ and https://entirelyuseless.wordpress.com/2017/10/01/predictive-processing/ ). However, compressibility is not so much a separate goal as an effect of trying to get an accurate description. A complicated explanation of your behavior would tend to overfit the past and therefore would tend to be less accurate than a simple one for predicting the future. And you are right that this model implies that your own attempt to understand your behavior causes it to become more coherent, since you first describe your behavior as goal oriented, and this directly causes it to be more goal oriented than it was at first.
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